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1. Introduction
The question whether banks use loan loss provisions (LLP) to manipulate
their reported earnings is examined by a fairly large empirical literature, with
rather mixed results.1 A certain degree of latitude in managing earnings can
arise through the element of judgement banks can exercise in the determi-
nation of loan loss provisions, which require an assessment of expected loan
losses. This assessment of expected loan losses may naturally involve a signif-
icant element of subjectivity. Therefore, banks may have the ability to also
pursue additional management objectives in the process, such as smoothing
their income by exaggerating loan loss provisions when income is high, and
understating them when income is low. Analyzing the earnings management
of banks is of importance as income smoothing compromises the faithful rep-
resentation of their underlying economic condition; accounting numbers no
longer reect the economic reality of underlying risk conditions in this case,
reducing the ability of stakeholders, such as regulators and debtholders, to
properly monitor banks. The last nancial crisis has shown that when bank
insiders exploit banks for their own purposes, the likelihood of bank failures
increases curtailing economic development and welfare more generally.
In this paper, we investigate whether ownership structure and national
institutional factors play an important role in determining these nancial
reporting characteristics of banks. More specically, we examine if di¤erences
in ownership concentration can explain di¤erences in the level of earnings
management, and if the regulatory environment plays a role in potentially
disciplining such corporate behavior. Banks with a high level of ownership
concentration (one or two controlling owners) could use discretionary LLP to
smooth their income, e.g. in an e¤ort to conceal behavior such as extraction
1See e.g. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), Wahlen (1994), Beatty et al. (1995), Beaver
and Engel (1996), Ahmed et al. (1999), Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), Kanagaretnam et al.
(2003), Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Hasan and Wall (2004), Bikker and Metzemakers
(2005), Liu and Ryan (2006), Anandarajan et al. (2007), Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008)
and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012).
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of private benets of control. Arguably, such income smoothing behavior
should, however, be less prominent for banks with a dispersed ownership
structure, or banks located in countries with stronger regulatory controls.
The existing literature analyzing the relationship between corporate gov-
ernance and earnings management mainly focusses on US rms with their
widely dispersed ownership structure, and mostly on non nancial rms. It
sees income smoothing mainly as an act of managerial self-dealing and as such
as an agency problem arising from the separation of ownership and control
(e.g. Lambert 1984 and Rozycki 1997 for non-nancial rms). This agency
problem can be addressed through internal corporate governance mechanisms
such as board e¤ectiveness and managerial compensation (e.g. Klein 2002,
Park and Shin 2004 and Zhao and Chen 2008, and specically for bank-
ing rms Cornett et al. 2009 and Leventis and Dimitropoulos 2012). How-
ever, when large shareholders are also involved in rm decision making, as
prevalent in continental Europe and Asia (La Porta et al. 1998), the con-
ict of interest shifts away from manager vs. shareholders to controlling
owner vs. minority shareholders, as large shareholders have incentives to
maximize their own benets at the cost of other shareholders. Internal cor-
porate governance mechanisms are less likely to limit such agency problems
as large investors elect representatives to the board of directors that will act
in their interest. Where controlling shareholders have incentives to manipu-
late earnings, it therefore becomes important to determine if governance by
external stakeholders, in particular regulators, can curb such behavior. To
date, the empirical literature analyzing the relationship between the level of
ownership concentration and management of earnings is very scarce. Using
country level measures of ownership concentration for panels of listed rms,
several authors nd mixed results showing that ownership concentration can
be associated with either lower or higher levels of earnings management (Leuz
et al. 2003 and Fan and Wong 2002 for non-nancial rms, Gebhardt and
Novotny-Farkas 2011 for banking rms).
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To investigate the e¤ect of ownership concentration on earnings manage-
ment, we use a rm-level data set on the ownership structure of banking
rms. We focus on banks as they play a particularly important role in the
nancial intermediation process of modern economies, and because they have
additional characteristics that require a separate analysis from non-nancial
rms. The nancial structure of banksassets combined with high leverage
makes them inherently more opaque than other rms (Morgan 2002), while
they are also heavily regulated in response to signicant negative external-
ities associated with bank failures. Banks have consequently a unique form
of corporate governance (Adams and Mehran 2003), with more stakehold-
ers than non-nancial rms, including depositors, non-insured debtholders,
deposit insurers and regulators. Maintaining a well-functioning and stable
nancial system requires a better understanding of how these di¤erent stake-
holders behave and interact together. The global nancial crisis triggered in
2007 has shed light on the severe malfunctioning of several mechanisms of
the internal and external governance of nancial institutions, prompting the
need to investigate better ways to strengthen accounting quality and ensure
sound corporate governance mechanisms in the banking industry.
Using a sample of European commercial banks over the period 2004-2009,
we nd that whether or not a bank practices income smoothing through LLP
does indeed depend on its degree of ownership concentration and the regu-
latory environment. For banks with a high level of ownership concentration,
we nd evidence of income smoothing through the use of LLP. This is sig-
nicantly less pronounced in countries with stronger supervisory regimes or
higher external audit quality, but independent of the level of shareholder
protection, the type of audit rm (Big Four or non-Big Four) and the level
of non-insured debt. Banks with low levels of ownership concentration are
found not to display such income smoothing behavior throughout.
Our contribution to the literature is then threefold. Firstly, we con-
tribute to the literature exploring the relationship between corporate gover-
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nance and earnings management by analyzing if ownership concentration is
an important determinant of earnings management, focussing on the bank-
ing sector. Secondly, as a number of institutional factors, such as banking
supervision, audit quality and investor protection, can have an impact on
accounting quality and earnings management, we further examine whether
national regulatory factors can play an important role in the relationship
between ownership concentration and the earnings management behavior of
banks. Thirdly, by analyzing the relationship between ownership concentra-
tion and earnings management using detailed bank level data especially on
their ownership structure, and examining a wider dataset containing both
listed and unlisted banks, we aim to obtain a better understanding of the
underlying mechanisms at work. For this we focus on a European dataset
which provides a substantial amount of variability between individual levels
of ownership concentration given the lack of regulatory limitations on the
percentage of bank capital owned by a single entity in Europe.
Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and develops the research ques-
tions we address; Section 3 describes our data, the ownership characterization
used and our baseline model specication; Section 4 presents and discusses
our results regarding the impact of ownership structure and regulatory envi-
ronment on income smoothing; Section 5 discusses further issues and contains
several robustness checks; and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review and research questions
The relationship between corporate governance and earnings management
has given rise to a large literature mainly focusing on the conict of inter-
est between managers and shareholders when rmsownership structure is
widely dispersed. Several theoretical papers show why managers might en-
gage in earnings management. Managers can manipulate earnings in order
to inuence the information set used by external investors and to maximize
their own interest in relation to career concerns (Amihud and Lev 1981), their
5
non-diversiable human capital (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and private ben-
ets of control (Demsetz and Lehn 1985, Kane 1985). Consistent with this
literature, the existing empirical literature, focussing predominantly on US
non-nancial rms, shows that managers engage in earnings management
to increase their compensation, to minimize their chance of being red, to
positively a¤ect the risk perception of the rm or to reduce future expected
income tax liabilities of investors (see e.g. Lambert 1984, Greenawalt and
Sinkey 1988, Rozycki 1997).
Boards of directors can play a signicant role in controlling agency prob-
lems between managers and shareholders as their role is to appoint/dismiss
and compensate management with the objective to maximize shareholder
value (Fama and Jensen 1983). Empirical studies provide mixed results
on board e¤ectiveness in monitoring management in the nancial reporting
process (see e.g. Klein 2002, Park and Shin 2004 and Zhao and Chen 2008
for non-nancial rms, and Cornett et al. 2009, Leventis and Dimitropoulos
2012 and Leventis et al. 2013 for banking rms). Another mechanism to con-
trol management is the market for corporate control: the threat of a hostile
takeover can make managers behave in accordance with the interests of cur-
rent shareholders (Jensen 1988). In banking, hostile takeovers are extremely
rare (Prowse 1997), mainly due to the opacity of banks and the regulatory
approval process for M&As in the banking industry.
These di¤erent corporate mechanisms aiming to rein in managersbehav-
ior are much less relevant, however, when the ownership structure is concen-
trated (Davies 2000). Large investors can elect their representative(s) to the
board of directors who will appoint a manager that will act in the interest
of these controlling shareholders. The conict of interest then shifts away
from managers vs. shareholders to one of controlling owner vs. minority
shareholders.2 The e¤ect of controlling ownership on rm value and on the
2Even if the minority shareholders may collectively hold more voting shares than the
controlling shareholders, the control of the rm will lie in the hand of the blockholder if
the shares held by the minority shareholders are widely dispersed.
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decision to manipulate earnings depends upon the trade-o¤ between shared
benets of control and any private extraction of rm value by controlling
shareholders. The theoretical literature demonstrates that controlling share-
holders can impose greater monitoring on management and use their inuence
to push managers to make decisions that increase overall shareholder value
and thereby benet all shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Shleifer and
Vishny 1986). In other words, concentrated ownership can align the interests
of controlling shareholders with those of non-controlling ones.
However, there can also be private benets of control in the sense that
they prot only controlling shareholders (Grossman and Hart 1988, Bebchuk
1999, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002). Some shareholders might enjoy the
"psychic" value attached to being in control; these benets do not neces-
sarily a¤ect other shareholders (Harris and Raviv 1988, Aghion and Bolton
1992). However, when controlling shareholders can engage in actual extrac-
tion of corporate resources, such as through perks or transfer of assets on
nonmarket terms to related parties, then other shareholders would be af-
fected through the resulting reduction in rm value (Jensen and Meckling
1976).3 When controlling shareholders pursue such objectives that are not
prot-maximizing but increase their personal utility, having such controlling
shareholders can lead to an entrenchment problem.
The consequences for earnings management of having a concentrated own-
ership structure are not a clear cut issue conceptually, which furthermore has
not been examined on a theoretical level to date. One could argue that under
the alignment hypothesis controlling owners have less incentive to engage in
earnings management that can potentially harm rm value. Under the en-
trenchment hypothesis, on the other hand, controlling owners can be thought
to be able to control the production of the rms accounting information and
therefore to manage the reporting of earnings to conceal their private control
3As the key element of private benets of control is the fact that they are di¢ cult to
observe by outsiders, measuring them in applied work is intrinsically di¢ cult; see Dyck
and Zingales (2004).
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benets from outsiders. Controlling shareholders could similarly use their -
nancial reporting discretion to overstate earnings and to conceal unfavorable
earnings realizations (such as losses) that could lead to interference by other
stakeholders (minority shareholders, debtholders and regulators).
An interesting question at the empirical level is then whether the degree of
ownership concentration has an impact on the level of earnings management.
Very few empirical papers analyze the relationship between the level of owner-
ship concentration and earnings management of rms, all using country level
data on ownership concentration. Leuz et al. (2003) nd di¤erences across
31 countries in earnings management of listed non-nancial rms. Consis-
tent with the hypothesis that rms use earnings management to conceal rm
performance from outsiders, their results show that rms in countries with
dispersed ownership structure engage in less earnings management. Fan and
Wong (2002), working on a panel of listed East Asian non-nancial rms,
nd that high ownership concentration and large separation of ownership
and control are associated with lower levels of earnings informativeness. On
the other hand, Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011), again using a coun-
try level measure of ownership concentration, nd that income smoothing is
higher in European countries where listed banks are widely held.
Our paper contributes to this literature exploring the relationship between
corporate governance and earnings management by analyzing if ownership
concentration, as measured at the rm level, is an important determinant
of earnings management, specically for the case of both listed and unlisted
European banks. We further investigate whether the existing regulatory
environment is an e¤ective means to curb the potential discretionary income
smoothing behavior of banks with high levels of ownership concentration in
this context.
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3. Data, ownership characterization and baseline specication
3.1. Data description
Our study focusses on European commercial banks, for which we extracted
both (unconsolidated) bank nancial statement data and banksindividual
ownership information from BvD BankScope, which provides detailed infor-
mation on the latter only starting 2004. Our data set therefore covers the
period 2004-2009, and includes the following European countries4: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
United Kingdom. We construct our panel data set using annual releases
of BankScope to capture the time-varying dimension of banks ownership
structure. BankScope provides unconsolidated nancial statement data for
1389 active European commercial banks for at least some of the period con-
sidered. Limiting our sample to European commercial banks which provide
information on loan loss provisions, and after eliminating extreme bank year
observations for all the variables of interest, we are left with a nal sample of
873 commercial banks;5 Table 1 gives a breakdown of these by country. Table
2 presents some general descriptive statistics for both our data set and the
corresponding full sample of banks available under BankScope. The median
data coverage of our sample, as measured in percent of total assets in the
wider BankScope one, lies at almost 93%, with very similar bank activity
characteristics between the two (see Table 1).6
4We refer to a geographical denition of Europe. The Swiss banking system plays an
important role in Europe and we therefore include it in our analysis.
5Bankscope labels as commercial banks institutions that are mainly active in a combi-
nation of retail banking, wholesale banking (large corporates) and private banking. This
broad denition implies that our sample can contain some commercial banks with a low
ratio of loans to total assets; to counter this, we drop the banks with the lowest 5% of the
ratio of loans to total assets from our sample.
6Note that very few banks in Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom provide
information on loan loss provisions.
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[Insert Tables 1 and 2]
3.2. Ownership measures
We follow several approaches in classifying banks by the degree of concentra-
tion in their ownership structure. We rstly use a simple criterion reecting
whether or not a bank has a majority shareholder (with equity holding7 larger
than 50%): the dummy variable NoMAJ takes the value of one if there is no
such majority shareholder, representing banks with a more dispersed owner-
ship structure.
We then use a more sophisticated clustering approach based on hierarchi-
cal agglomerative clustering (HAC) to account more accurately for several
dimensions of concentration/dispersion in banksownership structures (fol-
lowing Husson et al. 2010, Husson et al. 2011; see Appendix for details). We
consider three ownership measures in the construction of clusters of banks
with "similar" ownership characteristics: the percentage held by the largest
shareholder (Share1 ), the percentage held by the second-largest shareholder
(Share2 ) and a Herndahl index computed for a banks ownership distrib-
ution (HERF ). The rst two measures give meaningful information on the
shape of the ownership concentration, whereas the Herndahl index captures
the distribution of ownership for all shareholders. The HAC used relies on
the Euclidean distance to compute similarity between two banks, and uses
Wards method as the linkage rule to determine the distance between clusters
made up of several banks. We end up with three distinct bank clusters; banks
can change cluster over time if their ownership structure changes accordingly.
Table 2 gives some general descriptive statistics for banks in these clusters,
Table 3 reports statistics for the ownership measures for each of the three
clusters, and Figure 1 shows the position of each bank inside their respective
cluster.
Banks in Cluster 1 (low ownership concentration) are characterized by a
7We consider direct holdings only.
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relatively dispersed ownership structure. These banks have mostly a large
number of shareholders that do not hold controlling shares (i.e. less than
50% of the total shares), or, very rarely, one controlling shareholder with a
substantial number of shareholders that hold a small share each. Banks in
Cluster 2 (medium ownership concentration) have a more concentrated own-
ership structure with mainly two shareholders that together hold a controlling
stake, and some smaller shareholders. Banks in Cluster 3 (high ownership
concentration) present a very strong degree of ownership concentration with
one controlling shareholder that holds on average around 97% of the share
(with a minimum of nearly 70%). Amongst the 873 banks in our sample, 294
belong to Cluster 1, 182 to Cluster 2 and 594 to Cluster 3 at some point in
time, with 183 banks that change between clusters during the sample period.
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 1]
3.3. Baseline specication
In order to examine how a banks ownership structure and the regulatory
environment might a¤ect the way it can use discretionary LLP to smooth its
income, we build on an empirical baseline panel specication that is close
to those in Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), Cavallo and Majnoni (2001),
Bikker andMetzemakers (2005), Anandarajan et al. (2007) and Leventis et al.
(2011), di¤erentiating between discretionary and non-discretionary compo-
nents of banksloan loss provisioning behavior as follows
LLP i;j;t = 0 + 1LLP i;j;t 1 + 2ERi;j;t + 3EQ i;j;t 1 + 4Li;j;t
+ 5Li;j;t + 6COMj;t + 7yj;t + j + t + "i;j;t (1)
where LLP i;j;t is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets, and the
subscripts refer to bank i in country j for year t.
The non-discretionary component represents loan loss provisions made to
cover expected credit losses (Wahlen 1994, Beaver and Engel 1996, Hasan and
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Wall 2004) and exhibits a cyclical pattern (Laeven and Majnoni 2003, Bikker
and Metzemakers 2005). In our specication Equation (1) it is identied
by the loan to total assets ratio (Li;j;t), the loan growth rate (Li;j;t), the
GDP growth rate (yj;t) and the ratio of commission and fee income to
total asset (COMi;j;t).8 The loan to total assets ratio is generally used as an
indicator of risk of default for the overall credit portfolio and should therefore
positively a¤ect loan loss provisions. Similarly, the loan growth rate should
be positively related to loan loss provisions if loan expansions lead banks
to make general loan loss provisions. Moreover, banks having a relatively
high level of commission and fee income might allocate additional loan loss
provisions to signal that they are safe even if they provide multiple services
(Anandarajan et al. 2007, Leventis et al. 2011); we thus expect a positive
coe¢ cient for the variable COMi;j;t. At the macroeconomic level, the GDP
growth rate captures the creditworthiness of bankscustomers and should
therefore negatively a¤ect loan loss provisions.
The second, discretionary component of loan loss provisions captures
those made for managerial objectives such as income smoothing and capi-
tal management (Ahmed et al. 1999, Hasan and Wall 2004, Anandarajan
et al. 2007).9 Banks can use loan loss provisions to smooth their income,
i.e. they can understate (overstate) loan loss provisions when earnings are
expected to be low (high). We use the ratio of earnings before taxes and
loan loss provisions to total assets (ERi;j;t) to test if banks use loan loss
provisions to smooth their income; a positive relationship between this ratio
8We do not include the non performing loans to total net loans ratio in our core regres-
sions, as in Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) and Bikker and
Metzemakers (2005), as it drastically reduces our available sample (by two thirds); we do
however consider it as a robustness check in Section 5.6.
9Banks can also use loan loss provisions to signal their nancial strength (Ahmed et al.
1999, Kanagaretnam et al. 2004, Kanagaretnam et al. 2005, Leventis et al. 2012); this is
generally captured by the one-year-ahead change of earnings before taxes and loan loss
provisions (ERi;t+1   ERi;t) in the literature. Including this variable in our regressions
turned out signicant (see Section 5.6); however, as it reduces the number of usable years,
we dropped it from our core regressions.
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and LLP would be consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis. Banks
can also use loan loss provisions for capital management, even if scope for
such behavior is more limited since Basel 1 (and even more so under Basel
2):10 banks with low regulatory capital could be more inclined to make loan
loss provisions to keep their capital ratio adequate. To control for such cap-
ital management behavior, we use the lagged ratio of equity to total assets
(EQ i;j;t 1), expecting a negative relationship with loan loss provisions if cap-
ital management is present.11
We consider a dynamic adjustment of loan loss provisions, as progressive
provisioning practices of potential losses against loans or a concentration in
time of default events could lead to a time dependency. Country xed e¤ects
(j) and time xed e¤ects (t) are also included in the specication. We
use the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator, which is appro-
priate for dynamic panel specications (Baltagi 2005), to estimate Equation
(1). This estimator combines the original equation and a transformed one;
we apply the forward orthogonal deviations transformation of the original
equation as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and use the two-step
estimator including the Windmeijer (2005) nite-sample correction. In or-
der to limit the number of instruments, we restrict the lag range used in
generating them at four and the instrument matrix is collapsed as suggested
by Roodman (2009). The GMM instruments are only applied to the lagged
dependent variable (LLP i;t 1), whereas the other variables are considered as
strictly exogenous.
We check the validity of our estimates with the AR(2) test and the Hansen
test. The AR(2) test corresponds to the Arellano-Bond test which tests for
10The Basel I accord allows general loan loss reserves (which include general loan loss
provisions) to count toward Tier 2 capital up to a maximum of 1.25% of risk-weighted
assets. For banks using the IRB approach, Basel II changes this limit to 0.6% of credit-
risk-weighted assets.
11We use the equity to total assets ratio instead of the regulatory capital ratio, as data
availability would reduce our available sample by two thirds otherwise; see also footnote
12.
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absence of second-order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals.
The Hansen test allows for checking the validity, i.e. the exogeneity, of the
entire set of instruments as a group. We also ensure the absence of multi-
collinearity problems by computing the correlation matrix and the variance
ination factors (VIF), which have a mean value of 1.16 with a maximum of
1.27.
The results for our baseline regression of Equation (1), reported in Table
4, show that European commercial banks use discretionary loan loss provi-
sions to smooth their income, reected in a positive and signicant coe¢ cient
on the ratio of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to total assets
(ERi;j;t). Capital management, however, is not a signicant determinant of
loan loss provisioning practices for European banks as the coe¢ cient on the
lagged ratio of equity to total assets (EQ i;j;t 1) is not signicant.
12 As re-
gards the non-discretionary component of loan loss provisions, the coe¢ cient
of the variable loans to total assets (Li;j;t) is also signicant and positive,
capturing the risk of default for the overall credit portfolio, whereas the loan
growth rate (Li;j;t) and the impact of nontraditional activities (COMi;j;t)
turn out to be not signicant. The signicant and negative coe¢ cient for
the GDP growth rate (yj;t) indicates that macroeconomic conditions are
relevant, representing the cyclical behavior of LLP. Lastly, the coe¢ cient of
the lagged dependent variable is signicantly positive, indicating that banks
do adjust loan loss provisions gradually to recognize potential losses against
loans.
In the next section, we now examine whether ownership structure and the
regulatory environment play a role in the way banks use loan loss provisions
to smooth their income.
[Insert Table 4]
12For robustness, we also test (on a smaller sample of banks) the capital management
hypothesis using the regulatory capital ratio instead of the equity to total assets ratio.
We nd again that European banks do not use LLP for capital management objectives;
details are available upon request.
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4. Ownership structure and income smoothing
4.1. Role of ownership concentration
We now examine whether banks with more concentrated ownership struc-
tures display either higher degrees of income smoothing through loan loss
provisions, which would be consistent with the hiding of private benet ex-
traction (in line with the entrenchment hypothesis), or rather lower degrees
of income smoothing which could arise from increased monitoring of man-
agement (in line with the alignment hypothesis). For this we augment the
baseline specication of Equation (1) with variables reecting the degree of
ownership concentration as characterized in Section 3.2. This is to di¤er-
entiate between banks that have a concentrated ownership structure where
a small number of shareholders are able to exert control, and banks with
a more dispersed ownership structure that consists mostly of less powerful
shareholders. We consider the following two specications
LLP i;j;t = 0 + 1LLP i;j;t 1 + 2ERi;j;t + 3ERi;j;t  NoMAJ i;j;t
+
5P
k=1
3+kCNTRLk i;j;t + 9NoMAJ i;j;t + j + t + "i;j;t (2)
LLP i;j;t = 0 + 1LLP i;j;t 1 + 2ERi;j;t +
2P
k=1
2+kERi;j;t  Ck i;j;t
+
5P
k=1
4+kCNTRLk i;j;t +
2P
k=1
9+kCk i;j;t + j + t + "i;j;t (3)
where NoMAJ i;j;t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank does not
have a majority owner and 0 otherwise, and Ck i;j;t is a dummy variable which
equals 1 if the bank is in cluster k and 0 otherwise. If insiders in banks with
more concentrated ownership use LLP more to smooth the banks income,
in order to potentially hide the extraction of private benets, we would ex-
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pect the coe¢ cient on the interaction term ERi;j;t  NoMAJ i;j;t in Equation
(2) to be signicant and negative/positive to be in support of the entrench-
ment/alignment hypothesis, respectively. Equation (3) introduces the more
rened cluster dummy variables to represent ownership concentration, where
Cluster 3 (with high ownership concentration) is used as the reference cat-
egory. If banks with less concentrated ownership (i.e. classied in Clusters
1 or 2) engage in less income smoothing through LLP, the coe¢ cients on
the interaction terms ERi;j;t  C1 i;j;t and ERi;j;t  C2 i;j;t would be expected
to be signicant and negative/positive to be consistent with the entrench-
ment/alignment hypothesis, respectively.13 We also add the same set of con-
trol variables (CNTRLk i;j;t) as in Equation (1), i.e. the variables EQ i;j;t 1,
Li;j;t, Li;j;t, COMi;j;t and yj;t.
The estimation results for Equations (2) and (3), using the same estima-
tion methodology as for our baseline specication in Section 3.3, are given
in Table 4. We nd (at the 10% level) that banks without a majority share-
holder behave di¤erently overall from those with such a majority shareholder
in the way they use loan loss provisions to smooth their income. These banks
display a lower level of income smoothing behavior than banks with a ma-
jority shareholder, as shown by the Wald test on (2 + 3). Turning to the
more rened characterization of ownership concentration using a clustering
approach, we nd that banks with a low level of ownership concentration
(Cluster 1) behave di¤erently from those with medium and high levels of
ownership concentration (Clusters 2 and 3). In particular, banks in Clus-
ters 2 and 3 display the income smoothing behavior previously observed for
the overall sample, with a coe¢ cient of 0.0691 that is signicant at the 1%
level, whereas banks in Cluster 1 are seen not to display this kind of income
smoothing behavior (the Wald test on 2 + 3 is not signicant). These
results illustrate the strength of our clustering methodology compared with
13We cannot, however, directly test if higher ownership concentration is associated with
extraction of private benets as these are di¢ cult to measure or even observe; see footnote
3.
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the simple threshold approach implicit in the majority shareholder dummy.14
In particular, we can observe from Figure 1 that a large proportion of banks
in Cluster 2 do not have a majority shareholder, explaining the di¤erence in
results between the two approaches. Using the rened clustering approach,
our results are thus supporting the entrenchment hypothesis; this would be
consistent with banks that have more concentrated ownership structures ex-
tracting higher levels of private benets, and then trying to conceal this
behavior from outsiders, such as minority shareholders, debtholders and reg-
ulators, by smoothing their income through the use of loan loss provisions.
We can also emphasize the economic signicance of the observed income
smoothing behavior of banks with more concentrated ownership structure.
For this, we consider a 0.6273 increase in earnings, corresponding to a 50% in-
crease from the mean level of the variable ERi;j;t, and then evaluate the e¤ect
on loan loss provisions according to the estimated coe¢ cient from Equation
(3) reported in Table 4. We furthermore make the distinction between short
term e¤ect and long term e¤ect, in line with our dynamic specication. Our
calculations indicate that loan loss provisions increase by 14.15% in the short
run and by 20.94% in the long run (from their mean level) for banks which
belong to Clusters 2 and 3. The income smoothing behavior of banks with a
concentrated ownership structure is therefore not only statistically signicant
but also represents economically meaningful adjustments reported in income
statements.
4.2. Role of regulatory environment
We now examine whether the regulatory environment can constrain the in-
come smoothing behavior of insiders in banks with high ownership concen-
tration. Shen and Chih (2005), Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) and Leuz et al.
(2003) nd that higher investor protection results in lower earnings manage-
ment. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the ability of insiders to
14Robustness checks with thresholds lower than 50% are reported in Section 5.6.
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acquire private benets from control is limited by legal systems that protect
the rights of outside investors. Shen and Chih (2005) and Fonseca and Gon-
zalez (2008) further nd that there is less earnings management in countries
with greater transparency in accounting disclosure. More generally, a high
quality audit is expected to constrain opportunistic earnings management
(Becker et al. 1998, Francis et al. 1999). Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) also
show that banks in countries where supervisors have greater powers to dis-
cipline banks and to reduce their incentives to undertake risk display lower
levels of income smoothing. As we nd that European banks with a more
concentrated ownership structure use LLP to smooth their income, we want
to check if the regulatory environment can limit such opportunistic behavior.
For this we augment Equations (2)-(3) with interaction terms between ERi;j;t
and a regulatory index REG j as follows
LLP i;j;t = 0 + 1LLP i;j;t 1 + 2ERi;j;t + 3ERi;j;t  REG j
+ 4ERi;j;t  NoMAJ i;j;t +
5P
k=1
4+kCNTRLk i;j;t + 10NoMAJ i;j;t
+ 11REG j + t + "i;j;t (4)
LLP i;j;t = 0 + 1LLP i;j;t 1 + 2ERi;j;t + 3ERi;j;t  REG j
+
2P
k=1
3+kERi;j;t  Ck i;j;t +
5P
k=1
5+kCNTRLk i;j;t +
2P
k=1
10+kCk i;j;t
+ 13REG j + t + "i;j;t (5)
For the regulatory index REG j we rst consider an index for strength of
supervisory regime (SupReg j), drawn from the World Banks 2008 Bank Reg-
ulation and Supervision database, in line with Laeven and Levine (2009) and
Shehzad et al. (2010). It ranges in principle from 0 to 11, and covers capital
stringency and powers to intervene in and resolve troubled banks. For our
sample, the index has a median of 6 and ranges from 4 (Belgium, Italy and
18
Sweden) to 9 (Portugal, Switzerland and UK). While there is harmonization
of European rules on capital requirements for banks, there is heterogeneity
across European countries regarding their supervision. This heterogeneity
comes from di¤erent propensities of regulatory authorities to do on-site ex-
aminations in order to make an overall assessment of banks to determine
their economic condition. It also stems from regulatorsdi¤ering abilities
to remove and replace managers and directors or to force a bank to change
its internal organizational structure when problems are detected. If stronger
supervisory regimes can restrain the entrenchment behavior of insiders, we
expect the interaction term ERi;j;t  SupRegj to be signicant and negative.
We alternatively use an index measuring the quality of external audits
(QualAuditj). We use the World Banks 2008 Bank Regulation and Supervi-
sion database to compute an index that indicates (i) whether or not there is
independent assessment of the accuracy of nancial statements disclosed to
the public, and (ii) whether or not supervisors are empowered to take specic
actions to prevent and correct problems.15 The external audit quality index
ranges in principle from 0 to 11; it has a median of 9, with a minimum of 6
(Italy) and a maximum of 11 (Denmark, Switzerland) in our sample. Again
there is heterogeneity in Europe regarding the role of supervisors in ensuring
the reliability and integrity of the nancial process, depending on whether
they have inuence over the independence of auditors and can take legal
15The yes/no responses to the following questions are coded as 1/0: (1) Is an external
audit a compulsory obligation for banks?; (2) Are auditing practices for banks in accor-
dance with international auditing standards?; (3) Is it required by the regulators that bank
audits be publicly disclosed?; (4) Are specic requirements for the extent or nature of the
audit spelled out?; (5) Are auditors licensed or certied?; (6) Do supervisors get a copy of
the auditors report?; (7) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with exter-
nal auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank?; (8) Are auditors
required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involve-
ment of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse?;
(9) Are external auditors legally required to report to the supervisory agency any other
information discovered in an audit that could jeopardize the health of a bank? ; (10) Can
supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence?; and (11) Has legal
action been taken against an auditor in the last 5 years?
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action against them if problems are detected. We expect that the level of
monitoring and control imposed by external audits and supervisory actions
can constrain opportunistic earnings management, leading to a signicant
and negative coe¢ cient of the interaction term ERi;j;t QualAuditj.
We nally consider an index measuring the level of minority shareholder
protection (ShareProctj). We use the revised anti-director rights index in
Djankov et al. (2008), which ranges in principle from 0 to 6 and considers
shareholdersvoting powers, their ease of participation in corporate voting,
and their legal protection against expropriation by insiders.16 For our sample,
the index has a median of 3.5 and ranges from 2 (Greece, Italy and Luxem-
bourg) to 5 (UK). The ability of minority shareholders to ask questions to
managers or to engage in action against them varies widely across Euro-
pean countries. Part of this heterogeneity can be explained by di¤erences in
the legal system: French-civil-law countries have the weakest legal protec-
tion of investors whereas common-law countries have generally the strongest
legal system; German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries are located in
between. If minority shareholders have higher ability to control insiders,
we expect the interaction term ERi;j;t  ShareProctj to be signicant and
negative.
In order to examine the impact of di¤erent regulatory regimes on how
banks use LLP to smooth their income, dependent on the degree of ownership
concentration, we calculate the relevant marginal e¤ects as @LLP i;j;t=@ERi;j;t =
2 + 3  REG j + 4  NoMAJ i;j;t for Equation (4) and @LLP i;j;t=@ERi;j;t =
2 + 3  REG j +
2P
k=1
3+k  Ck i;j;t for Equation (5), with REG j evaluated
at minimum, median and maximum levels. To facilitate interpretation of
regression coe¢ cients in this context, we scale the three regulatory indices
to have a minimum of zero.
16This index considers laws and regulations applicable to publicly listed rms. Similar
disclosure requirements, approval procedures and facilitation of private litigation are relied
on by owners of non-listed rms to deter managerial misconduct. We thus consider this
index for our sample of both listed and non-listed rms.
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We observe from the baseline Equation (1) in Table 5 that banks in coun-
tries with stronger supervisory regimes (i.e. higher SupRegj) perform less
income smoothing through LLP, in line with Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008),
with those in the countries with the strongest supervisory regimes show-
ing no income smoothing through LLP at all. We also nd that banks in
countries with higher quality of external audits (i.e. higher QualAuditj) are
less engaged in income smoothing (see Table 6). We further do not observe
any income smoothing behavior in countries with the highest external audit
quality. These results hold whether or not banks have a majority shareholder
(Equation (4) in Tables 5 and 6). These results are similarly conrmed in the
more rened analysis of Equation (5), which di¤erentiates between clusters
of ownership concentration. Banks in Clusters 2 and 3, i.e. with medium and
high levels of ownership concentration, use LLP less to smooth their income
in countries with either stronger supervisory regimes or higher external au-
dit quality, with no such income smoothing in the countries with either the
strongest supervisory regimes or the highest external audit quality. Banks in
Cluster 1, i.e. with low levels of ownership concentration, are seen to use LLP
to smooth their income in countries with the weakest supervisory regimes or
the lowest external audit quality, albeit to a much lesser degree than those in
Clusters 2 and 3; they do not show any signicant evidence of this kind of dis-
cretionary income smoothing behavior in countries with stronger supervisory
regimes or higher external audit quality. These results thus are consistent
with the entrenchment e¤ect being more moderate in countries with stronger
supervisory regimes or stronger external audit quality systems.
The degree of minority shareholder protection (ShareProct j), on the other
hand, based on the results from estimating Equations (4)-(5) given in Table 7,
is seen not to have a signicant impact on the income smoothing behavior of
European commercial banks. In particular, we observe from the more rened
analysis of Equation (5) that banks with medium and high levels of ownership
concentration use LLP to smooth their income irrespective of the level of
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shareholder protection. This result is not surprising for Cluster 3 (high level
of ownership concentration), given that here the controlling shareholder holds
on average around 97%. For Cluster 2, on the other hand, the corresponding
average lies at 56%, which could have left room for higher degrees of minority
shareholder protection to have an impact through reducing the scope for
entrenchment. Again, banks with low levels of ownership concentration (and
therefore a predominance of minority shareholders) are seen not to engage
in income smoothing behavior.
[Insert Tables 5, 6 and 7]
5. Further issues and robustness checks
We now examine several additional factors that could also have an impact
on the income smoothing behavior of banks, and perform a range of further
robustness checks.
5.1. Risk preferences
The income smoothing observed for banks with high ownership concentration
could also be driven by the potential impact of the risk preferences of control-
ling shareholders. Shareholders are generally viewed as more risk-loving than
managers. In the case of banks, the risk appetite of shareholders compared
to managers and debtholders could be even stronger due to the existence
of deposit insurance (Merton 1977) and the convex payo¤s faced by share-
holders more generally (John et al. 1991). Banks that have more powerful
shareholders could display higher levels of bank risk, as conrmed empiri-
cally by Laeven and Levine (2009) and Haw et al. (2010). Such banks might
then have increased incentives to conceal such higher risk taking by smooth-
ing their income, as compared to banks with a more dispersed ownership
structure, where managers risk preference could prevail. For banks, such
concealing of risk taking could be facilitated by the fact that the nancial
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structure of their assets combined with high leverage makes them inherently
more opaque than other rms (Morgan 2002). This makes such potential in-
come smoothing more di¢ cult to detect by outsiders, in particular as banks
can smooth their income through subjective judgements in the determination
of loan loss provisions, which require an assessment of expected loan losses.
In order to di¤erentiate the impact of risk preferences from the presumed
entrenchment behavior of controlling shareholders, we augment the specica-
tion of Equation (3) by introducing an additional interaction term between
the variable ERi;j;t and bank risk measures (RISKi;j;t). We consider two
such measures of bank risk computed from accounting data, using 3-year
rolling windows. To reect bank activity risk, we use the standard deviation
of adjusted return on equity (SDAdjROE i;j;t), with adjusted return on equity
AdjROE i;j = ERi;j=Ei;j , where ERi;j is earnings before taxes and loan loss
provisions and Ei;j is total equity. We adjust our activity risk measures in
this fashion to avoid a potential risk measurement bias introduced for banks
that use loan loss provisions to smooth their income; this bias could occur
when standard return on equity measures are used that rely on net income
(i.e. earnings after taxes and loan loss provisions) instead.
To proxy bank insolvency risk, we analogously use an adjusted Z-score
measure,17 dened as AdjZ i;j;t=
 
100 + AdjROE i;j;t

=SDAdjROE i;j;t, where
AdjROE i;j is the average adjusted return on equity (in percentages). As our
bank risk measures are highly skewed, we use their natural logarithms in our
specications; we further use centered versions of these for ease of interpreta-
tion. We expect the interaction term ERi;j;t RISKi;j;t to be signicant if the
risk preferences of insiders impact the way banks smooth their income. We
also introduce the variable RISKi;j;t as a control variable,18 and we apply
the GMM instruments to deal with potential endogeneity issues.
17This Z-score measure is based on the Bienaymé-Chebyshev inequality, analogous to
Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Boyd et al. (1993).
18The correlations between the variables RISKi;j;t and LLPi;j;t 1 are relatively low
(respectively -0.0663 and 0.0991 for AdjZ i;j;t and SDAdjROE i;j;t).
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The estimation results, using the same estimation methodology as for
our baseline specication in Section 3.3, are given in Table 8. We ob-
serve throughout that bank risk has no signicant impact on banksincome
smoothing behavior using LLP, which even allowing for bank risk taking
remains driven by banksownership concentration, in line with the entrench-
ment hypothesis.19
[Insert Table 8]
5.2. Listed vs. non-listed banks
Whether banks are listed or non-listed could have a signicant impact on both
the incentives and the ability of bank insiders to use LLP to smooth bank in-
come. Some parts of the existing literature argue that earnings management
should be higher in public than private rms if managers of public compa-
nies have higher incentives to report earnings that capital market participants
will perceive favorably, leading them to engage in more earnings management
(Beatty and Harris 1999, Beatty et al. 2002, Nichols et al. 2009, Fonseca and
Gonzalez 2008). However, outside investors who do not have access to private
information and only rely on public information might be reluctant to sup-
ply capital to rms that display poor quality information. Listed rms have
therefore incentives to provide nancial statements that help these outsiders
assess their economic performance, resulting in less earnings management
(Burgstahler et al. 2006). Moreover, since 2005 listed banks in the European
Union are required to comply with International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRS). Those accounting rules might reduce the ability of rms to
engage in earnings management as they improve transparency of reporting
practices (Barth et al. 2008, Leventis et al. 2011).20 Furthermore, supervisors
19In Table 8, we do not include the estimation results using the variable NoMAJi;j;t
instead of the cluster dummy variables Cki;j;t. For this case we also nd that bank risk
has no impact on banksincome smoothing behavior (results are available on request).
20Firms had the choice to adopt IFRS accounting standards prior to the mandatory
adoption date of 2005; this can be seen as a commitment to greater transparency resulting
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apply more scrutiny to "too big to fail banks" and might therefore be better
able to limit their income smoothing behavior through LLP (Fonseca and
Gonzalez 2008).
Out of the 98 listed banks we have in our full sample of 873 banks, 78
belong to Cluster 1 at some point in time (which has 294 banks in total), 32 to
Cluster 2 and 19 to Cluster 3, with 31 banks moving between clusters during
the sample period. To make sure that the smaller level of income smoothing
observed in Cluster 1 is not simply due to a predominance of listed banks, we
augment the specication of Equations (1)-(3) by introducing an additional
interaction term between the variable ERi;j;t and the variable LISTEDi;j;t;
the latter takes the value of 1 if bank i is listed on the stock market and 0
otherwise. We also introduce the variable LISTEDi;j;t as a control variable,
and use the same estimation methodology as for previous specications.
Our results are consistent with the argument that listed banks have less
scope for managing earnings using loan loss provisions (see Table 9), possi-
bly explained by outsidersdemand for useful information in evaluating the
rms and the scrutiny of supervisors.21 Importantly though, our previous
results that banks with high levels of ownership concentration are engaged
in income smoothing behavior whereas banks with low levels of ownership
concentration display signicantly lower levels of such discretionary behavior
in less earnings management (Leventis et al. 2011). This argument does not apply for our
unconsolidated bank sample as listed rms in the European Union are only required to
comply with IFRS for consolidated statements. Banks can choose to adopt IFRS for their
unconsolidated statement in 2004 for at least two reasons: (i) early adoption, or (ii) to
comply with the choice of accounting standard of the parent company; this implies that
we are not able to clearly identify early adopters in 2004.
21We check if our results might be driven by banks that are cross-listed in the US. US
securities law a¤ords stronger rights to outside investors than those in most other countries;
these constrain insiders from expropriating minority shareholders, potentially leading to
less earnings management (Stulz 1999). Controling for that, we nd that the interaction
term ERi;j;t CROSS_LISTED_USi;j;t is not signicant (with CROSS_LISTED_US
taking the value of 1 for banks cross-listed on the US stock market). However, only 12
European banks in our sample are cross-listed in the US, so this result must be taken with
care; details are available upon request.
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remain unchanged, independent of whether they are listed or non-listed.
[Insert Table 9]
5.3. Big Four auditors
In addition to the country level index we use to measure external audit qual-
ity, we also consider whether or not banks are audited by one of the Big Four
rms as a bank level measure of audit quality. In countries where poor audit
quality can lead auditors to face high litigation risk (such as US and UK),
one can expect that rms audited by a Big Four auditor display lower lev-
els of earnings management. Indeed, empirical evidence has been provided
that Big Four auditors constrain the earnings management of rms (e.g. De-
Fond and Jiambalvo 1991, Becker et al. 1998 and Kanagaretnam et al. 2010).
However, auditors may have incentives to "go easy" on management in order
to keep them as clients; such behavior can be more particularly observed in
countries with lower legal enforcement and lower investor protection (Francis
and Wang 2008, Maijoor and Vanstraelen 2006).
In order to test if the presence of a Big Four auditor can override the
observed di¤erences in the level of earnings management as a result of own-
ership concentration and di¤erences in regulatory environments, we augment
the specication of Equations (4)-(5) with an additional interaction term
between the variable ERi;j;t and the variable BIG4i;j;t; the latter takes the
value of 1 if bank i is audited by a Big Four rm (Deloitte, Ernst & Young,
KPMG or PwC) and 0 otherwise. We also introduce the variable BIG4i;j;t as
a control variable, and use the same estimation methodology as previously.
Results in Table 10 show that banks audited by a Big Four rm do not
display a lower level of income smoothing using LLP than banks audited by
a non-Big Four one, suggesting that Big Four auditors do not contribute to
improving the quality of published nancial statements of European banks
compared to non-Big Four ones. However, a stricter national supervisory
and audit quality regime limits the degree to which banks use LLP to smooth
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their income irrespective of the type of auditor involved (Big Four or non-Big
Four). Our results are thus in line with the recommendations of the Inter-
national Organization of Securities Commissions (International Organization
of Securities Commissions 2002) and the Financial Stability Board for hav-
ing an "external auditor oversight body" that should have the authority to
perform reviews of audit procedures and to take disciplinary action against
auditors as appropriate.
[Insert Table 10]
5.4. Market discipline of debtholders
The decision to smooth income using LLP increases bank opacity, and should
therefore be considered undesirable by stakeholders such as regulators and
debtholders. We have already found that strong regulatory control can reduce
the scope for banks to engage in discretionary income smoothing behavior us-
ing their LLP. We further want to analyze if the market discipline potentially
applied by debtholders can also limit earnings management by bank insiders.
As pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), debtholders are in a position
of power as their loans typically have a short maturity, which means bor-
rowers have to renance at regular, short intervals. However, nancial rms
are much more leveraged than non-nancial rms and have dispersed debt in
the form of many small depositors, making debt renegotiations more di¢ cult
and thereby weakening the market discipline of debtholders (Acharya et al.
2009). In addition, deposit insurance leads banks to rely less on uninsured
creditors, who have incentives to monitor, and more on insured depositors,
who have little incentive to exert corporate governance (Levine 2004). More-
over, any existing bail out policy may also limit the incentives of uninsured
creditors to monitor banks. More importantly, earnings management might
not be easy to detect by debtholders, especially in the case of banks that are
inherently more opaque than other rms and that can use subjective LLP to
smooth their income.
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We examine if uninsured debtholders are likely to have the incentives and
ability to monitor insidersactions by augmenting Equations (4)-(5) with an
interaction term between ERi;j;t and the variable MFi;j;t, the latter mea-
suring the proportion of market funding (i.e. money-market funding, bonds,
subordinated debt and hybrid capital) to total liabilities. The variableMFi;j;t
is a proxy to measure the magnitude of market discipline potentially applied
by non-insured debtholders. The higher the proportion of non-insured debt,
the stronger should be the resulting market discipline. Results in Table 11
show that the coe¢ cient associated with the interaction term ERi;j;t MFi;j;t
is not signicant, meaning that whatever the level of non-insured debt, there
is no decrease in the income smoothing behavior of banks having a relatively
high level of ownership concentration.
Levine (2004) argues that the e¤ectiveness of market discipline relies on
legal systems as violations of contract need to be identied to allow debthold-
ers to exert corporate governance. We therefore further di¤erentiate countries
according to their rule of law and the quality of its enforcement to allow for
what rights debtholders have and how well these rights are protected. For
this, we build the index Legalj as the average score across two proxies from
La Porta et al. (1998): (i) an index of the judicial systems e¢ ciency, and
(ii) an index of the rule of law. The resulting index Legalj ranges from 0
to 10 with higher values corresponding to stricter legal enforcement, with a
minimum and maximum of 6.59 and 10, respectively, in our sample.22 The
variable WMFi;j;t is then computed as the product of the variable MFi;j;t
and the index Legalj; this weighted measure of market discipline takes into
account how the quality of enforcement of laws varies across European coun-
tries. Using this weighted measure (WMFi;j;t) in our regressions instead of
the non-weighted proxy for the impact of market discipline (MFi;j;t), our
results remain unchanged (see Table 11). Again, banks with high levels of
22Information on legal enforcement is not provided for Luxembourg in La Porta et al.
(1998).
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ownership concentration do engage in income smoothing behavior whereas
banks with low levels of ownership concentration do not (consistent with the
entrenchment hypothesis), independent of the level of their non-insured debt
and the quality of law enforcement.
These results are consistent with debtholders either having limited incen-
tives to monitor banks or lacking the ability to detect earnings management
due to banksinherent opaqueness.
[Insert Table 11]
5.5. Type of majority shareholder
The existing literature highlights that di¤erent shareholder types can have
di¤erent propensities to engage in opportunistic earnings management. Insti-
tutional investors as majority shareholder have both the resources, expertise
and incentives to monitor and inuence management decisions. However,
prior empirical studies fail to reach a consensus on the inuence of institu-
tional ownership on earnings management. Bushee (1998) and Bange and
De Bondt (1998) nd that institutional ownership reduces incentives of rms
to manage earnings (related to R&D), while Chung et al. (2002) nd that
rms with large institutional shareholders refrain from earnings management,
as it reduces the transparency of the rms underlying nancial position.
Families as majority shareholders, on the other hand, might have stronger
incentives to pursue private benets (Claessens et al. 2002). Prencipe et al.
(2008) show that family-controlled rms display higher levels of earnings
management, consistent with the hypothesis that controlling families manip-
ulate earnings to cover self-oriented behavior. Wang (2006) and Ali et al.
(2007), on the other hand, nd that family-controlled rms have fewer incen-
tives to engage in earnings management. This can be linked to reputational
e¤ects and controlling families caring about the long-term viability of the
rm, resulting in higher monitoring of managers. Given these mixed results
regarding the propensities of controlling institutional investors and families
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to engage in opportunistic income smoothing behavior, we want to investi-
gate whether for banks with a majority shareholder (holding more than 50%)
the relationship between LLP and bank earnings depends on the type of that
shareholder.
For this we build on the specication of Equation (2) by adding inter-
action terms between ERi;j;t and majority shareholder type dummies. We
follow the BankScope classication in di¤erentiating between the following
shareholder types: banks, institutional investors, industrial rms, individuals
and families, managers, state, public, foundations, and unnamed sharehold-
ers. The dummy variable Mbank i;j;t then takes the value of 1 if the majority
shareholder is a bank and 0 otherwise; we similarly construct Mindust i;j;t
for industrial rms, Mfamily i;j;t for individuals and families, and Mother i;j;t
for all remaining shareholder types excluding institutional investors.23 The
reference category for the resulting interaction terms between ERi;j;t and
the di¤erent shareholder type dummies is thus banks where the majority
shareholder is an institutional investor. In our sample, banks dominant
shareholders fall predominantly into the categories of banks, institutional
investors, industrial rms, and to a lesser degree, individuals and families.
Dominant shareholdings by managers and the government, on the other hand,
are much less common in our sample.
The results in Table 12 show that banks with a controlling shareholder do
engage in earnings management through LLP; however, this opportunistic in-
come smoothing behavior is independent of whether the majority shareholder
belongs to the categories of either institutional investors, families, industrial
rms or banks. Thus, the impact of entrenchment in this context is indepen-
dent of the majority shareholder type.
[Insert Table 12]
23These are managers, state, public, foundations, and unnamed shareholders; we do not
have enough observations for these to consider them as separate groups. We also add the
sets of dummy variables Duml i;j;t on their own, i.e. {NoMAJ i;j;t, Mbank i;j;t, Mindust i;j;t,
Mfamily i;j;t, Mother i;j;t}.
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5.6. Further robustness checks
We carry out several additional robustness checks on our empirical results.24
Firstly, in Equation (2), we replace the NoMAJ dummy variable, which
reects whether or not a bank has a majority shareholder, with the dummy
variable NoDOM which alternatively uses thresholds of 40%, 25% and 10% to
dene whether or not a bank has a dominant shareholder. The results show
that, in line with the results found using our more rened cluster methodol-
ogy, banks without a dominant shareholder do not use loan loss provisions to
smooth their income whether that threshold is put at the 40%, 25% or 10%
level.
Secondly, we did not include the non-performing loans to total net loans
ratio in our main regressions, as this drastically reduces our available sample
from 873 to 376 banks; introducing this variable, analogously to Ahmed et al.
(1999), in Equations (1)-(3) does not change our main results.25
We then further rerun our main income smoothing regressions excluding
the "crisis" years 2008 and 2009 from our sample; this again leaves our main
results unchanged.
We also allow for the fact that banks can also use loan loss provisions to
signal their nancial strength. In the literature this is generally captured by
the one-year-ahead change of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions
(ERi;t+1   ERi;t) (Ahmed et al. 1999, Kanagaretnam et al. 2004). As this
reduces the number of usable years, we dropped it from our core regressions;
including this variable does provide evidence for such signalling behavior, but
does not change our main results.
A last robustness issue relates to Spains implementation of a dynamic
loan loss provisioning system in 2000; a dynamic provisioning system entails
statistical provisions, which are dened by accounting rules to cover expected
24While we do not include the estimation results discussed in this section, they are
available on request.
25The sample size becomes too small to meaningfully examine Equations (4)-(5) in this
case.
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loan losses, evaluated over a whole business cycle. As a result, loan loss
provisions are smoothed over time.26 To make sure this does not inuence
our results, we rerun our main income smoothing regressions excluding Spain
from our sample; our main results remain unchanged.
6. Conclusion
We empirically examined whether the way a bank might use LLP to smooth
its income is inuenced by its ownership structure and the regulatory en-
vironment in place. For this we constructed a novel database on European
commercial banks for the period 2004-2009 with detailed information on
banksindividual ownership structure. We also used a clustering approach
to distinguish between banks with di¤erent degrees of ownership concentra-
tion.
We nd evidence that banks with a more concentrated ownership struc-
ture use discretionary LLP to smooth their income, which would be consistent
with the hiding of private benet extraction (in line with the entrenchment
hypothesis). This behavior is less pronounced in countries with stronger su-
pervisory regimes or higher quality of external audits, but independent of
the level of shareholder protection, the type of audit rm (Big Four or non-
Big Four), the type of the majority shareholder, the level of bank risk and
the level of non-insured debt. Banks with dispersed ownership structure are
found not to display this kind of earnings management behavior.
The fact that banks with high levels of ownership concentration in par-
ticular use discretionary loan loss provisions to smooth their income in coun-
tries characterized by weaker supervision or lower quality of external audits
highlights a malfunctioning of internal but also external governance mecha-
nisms. This suggests the need to improve existing or implement new corpo-
rate governance mechanisms, in line with the concern expressed by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) that "there are unique corporate
26See Saurina (2009) for more details.
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governance challenges posed where [...] insiders or controlling shareholders
exercise inappropriate inuences on the banks activities".
Our suggestions for regulatory reform would be to push for more trans-
parency regarding ownership structure, as an opaque ownership structure
limits potential market discipline brought by stakeholders such as minority
shareholders and debtholders. This requires strict information disclosure re-
garding banksownership structure, such as major share ownership and vot-
ing rights, benecial owners, major shareholder participation on the board or
in senior management positions. Where such information is not disclosed, the
regulatory system should ensure that it is obtainable as a minimum by reg-
ulatory and enforcement agencies. We furthermore advocate that countries
with high levels of ownership concentration in banking should aim for high
levels of supervision and external audit quality. Alternatively, countries with
weaker regulatory regimes could force banks to have a diversied ownership
model in order to limit the inuence of controlling shareholders on the use of
income smoothing. A drastic way to do this would be to limit the size of the
stake any given shareholder, or coalitions of shareholders, can hold in a bank.
Making such a restriction e¤ective would however necessitate controlling for
the possibility that ownership concentration can also arise through pyramidal
ownership structures. The examination of earnings management in relation
to such more complex ownership structures could be an interesting direction
for future research.
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Appendix: Clustering methodology
We use hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) combined with parti-
tional clustering (Husson et al. 2010, Husson et al. 2011) to account more
accurately for similarities/dissimilarities in banksownership structures.
The HAC, based on an agglomerative algorithm, allows building a hier-
archy from individuals. In our case, individuals are banks observed yearly
and characterized by their ownership structure. Initially, each individual is
considered as a separate cluster. The agglomerative algorithm progressively
merges clusters according to their similarities which are based on multiple
dimensions, i.e. evaluated on a set of variables. We need to specify the
distance measure and the linkage rule to implement the HAC; the former
determines how the similarity of two individuals is computed and the lat-
ter how the hierarchy is built. We use the Euclidean distance as the most
commonly chosen type of distance.27 At the rst step of the agglomerative
algorithm, similarities can be computed directly with the distance measure,
as each individual is considered as a singleton cluster. However, from the
second step onwards, a linkage rule is also needed to determine the distance
between clusters made up of several individuals. For this we use Wards
method which is based on an analysis of variance approach, and generally
viewed as very e¢ cient. In particular, it minimizes at each step the increase
in variance for the pair of clusters being merged.
The hierarchy obtained from the HAC can be illustrated by a tree struc-
ture called a dendrogram. Cutting the tree before the root allows therefore
to partition the sample into k clusters. The classical rule used to choose
the number of clusters is based on the growth of the between-clusters iner-
tia according to the number of clusters. We retain k clusters so that the
increase of between-clusters inertia from k   1 to k clusters is high relative
27The Euclidean distance (i.e. the geometric distance in a multidimensional space) is
not applied to raw data, but to variables that are standardized in order to deal with scale
di¤erences between them.
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to the one from k to k + 1 clusters. This is analogous to a high decrease of
within-clusters inertia from k   1 to k clusters relative to the one from k to
k + 1 clusters.28 More precisely, we choose k clusters so that the number k
minimizes
min
kminkkmax
W (k) W (k + 1)
W (k   1) W (k)
where W (k) is the within-clusters inertia obtained with k clusters. In ad-
dition, we consider kmin = 3 and kmax = 10 as suggested by Husson et al.
(2010).29 The di¤erence W (k   1)   W (k) corresponds to a decrease of
within-clusters inertia when moving from k   1 to k clusters, that is equal
to an increase of between-clusters inertia when moving from k  1 to k clus-
ters. The optimal number k resulting from the minimization of this criterion
indicates that a smaller number of clusters implies a signicant increase of
within-clusters inertia while a higher number of clusters does not lead to
a substantial within-clusters inertia gain. According to the criterion mini-
mization, we conclude for our sample that the optimal number of clusters is
3.
In a second step, partitional clustering, i.e. a k-means algorithm, is ap-
plied to the 3 clusters obtained from the HAC in order to improve (or consol-
idate) the partition obtained from the HAC. The HAC is useful to determine
the number of clusters; however, the agglomerative algorithm used in it can
never undo what was done previously. In other words, individuals assigned
to a cluster in the early stages cannot move to another cluster afterwards.
Due to this constraint, the partition obtained from the HAC could be not
optimal. The k-means algorithm allows to move individuals between the k
clusters in order to minimize the within-clusters inertia.30 The partition re-
28The total inertia (which does not depend on k) is equal to the within-clusters inertia
plus the between-clusters inertia according to the Huygens theorem.
29If kmin = 2; the optimal number of clusters given by the criterion minimization is very
often equal to 2 because the within-clusters inertia decreases sharply when moving from
1 to 2 clusters.
30More precisely, the partition obtained from the HAC is used as the initial partition of
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sulting from the k-means algorithm ensures that the k clusters are as distinct
as possible. To sum up, the HAC allows to determine the optimal number of
clusters and the partitional clustering ensures the quality of the partition.
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Figure 1: Position of banks inside their respective cluster
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 Table 1. Distribution of banks by country over the period 2004-2009 
Country Our sample of commercial 
banks 
Full sample of commercial 
banks in BankScope 
Percent of total assetsa
Austria 47 79 54.20 
Belgium 21 44 95.65 
Denmark 51 60 96.87 
Finland 6 9 98.22 
France 140 180 97.43 
Germany 137 192 96.19 
Greece 16 19 97.33 
Ireland 7 34 5.22 
Italy 132 172 90.87 
Luxembourg 65 95 86.58 
Netherlands 8 39 1.22 
Norway 11 16 73.54 
Portugal 17 25 94.67 
Spain 57 83 85.32 
Sweden 14 22 97.71 
Switzerland 94 168 92.64 
U.K. 50 152 1.13 
Total 873 1389 Median = 92.64 
a Percent of total assets represents total assets of commercial banks in our sample divided by total assets of 
commercial banks of the full sample of banks provided by BvD BankScope for the year 2009. 
 
 
 Table 2. General descriptive statistics, on average over the period 2004-2009 
 L EQ LLP ER DEP MF ROA ROE COM TA 
Our sample of commercial banks 
All banks (873 banks, 3406 observations)  
Mean 55.69 9.49 0.32 1.30 49.69 15.21 0.71 8.51 1.36 24,921 
Maximum 99.94 78.94 3.70 16.52 97.69 92.13 15.08 78.08 27.19 2,246,380 
Minimum 4.73 0.31 -1.57 -14.50 1.31 0.03 -13.06 -90.69 -5.79 13 
Std. Dev. 26.69 7.70 0.52 1.51 26.45 15.59 1.19 12.42 2.35 111,748 
Cluster 1 Low ownership concentration (852 observations) 
Mean 60.34 9.89 0.32 1.41 51.72 17.70 0.80 8.70 1.22 47,328 
Std. Dev. 23.37 6.32 0.47 1.51 23.84 15.79 1.20 10.42 2.28 166,566 
Cluster 2 Medium ownership concentration (528 observations) 
Mean 57.81 9.21 0.37 1.33 47.25 15.49 0.66 7.10 1.23 16,111 
Std. Dev. 26.84 6.26 0.53 1.38 27.83 16.94 1.09 10.62 1.87 97,352 
Cluster 3 High ownership concentration (2026 observations) 
Mean 53.18 9.39 0.30 1.25 49.47 14.09 0.68 8.80 1.46 17,426 
Std. Dev. 27.62 8.55 0.53 1.54 27.08 15.00 1.21 13.56 2.48 82,038 
Full sample of commercial banks available in  BankScope (1389 banks) 
Mean 48.28 14.67 0.46 1.46 48.88 15.03 0. 87 7.83 2.72 19,258 
Std. Dev. 30.36 18.17 1.05 2.58 28.02 16.40 3.86 14.89 8.18 96,708 
Variable definitions (all variables are expressed in percentages, except TA which is in millions of Euros): L = net loans/total assets; EQ = equity/total assets; LLP = loan loss 
provisions/total assets; ER = earnings before taxes & loan loss provisions/total assets; DEP = deposits/total assets; MF = (money-market funding + bonds + subordinated debt 
+ hybrid capital)/total assets; ROA = return on assets; ROE = return on equity; COM  =  commissions & fees income/total assets; TA = total assets (millions of Euros). 
Clusters 1-3 are determined using a hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) approach that uses three ownership measures in the construction of clusters of banks with 
"similar" ownership characteristics: the percentage held by the largest shareholder, the percentage held by the second-largest shareholder, and a Herfindahl index computed 
for a bank's ownership distribution. 
 Table 3. Descriptive statistics on ownership concentration by cluster, on average over 
the period 2004-2009 
 Share1 Share2 HERF 
All banks in our sample (3406 observations) 
Mean 74.07 7.89 0.67 
Std. Dev. 31.99 12.50 0.37 
Minimum 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 100.00 50.00 1.00 
Cluster 1 Low ownership concentration (852 observations) 
Mean 29.71 8.28 0.14 
Std. Dev. 20.64 5.94 0.13 
Minimum 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Maximum 70.29 25.13 0.53 
Mean test 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Cluster 2 Medium ownership concentration (528 observations) 
Mean 56.08 32.25 0.45 
Std. Dev. 13.59 9.68 0.13 
Minimum 25.00 14.99 0.09 
Maximum 81.67 50.00 0.70 
Mean test 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Cluster 3 High ownership concentration (2026 observations) 
Mean 97.42 1.21 0.95 
Std. Dev. 6.04 3.05 0.10 
Minimum 69.80 0.00 0.48 
Maximum 100 17.50 1.00 
Mean test 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Variable definitions: Share1 = percentage held by largest shareholder; Share2 = percentage held by second-
largest shareholder; HERF= Herfindahl index on bank's ownership distribution (we compute for each bank i the 
variable OSj, defined by the ratio of the percentage of equity held by each shareholder  j to the total percentage of 
equity held by all shareholders; we then compute HERF as n 2jj=1 OS , with n  the total number of shareholders).  
Mean test examines if the variable has the same mean in the cluster and in the rest of the sample (bilateral test); 
the P-value of the test is reported, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Clusters 1-3 are determined using a hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) approach that uses three 
ownership measures (Share1, Share2 and HERF) in the construction of clusters of banks with "similar" 
ownership characteristics. 
 
 
 Table 4. Degree of ownership concentration and income smoothing for European 
commercial banks for the period 2004-2009 (two-step system GMM estimator) 
 Eq. (1) 
(Baseline) 
Eq. (2) Eq. (3) 
LLPi,j,t-1   0.3292*** 
(0.0455) 
0.3288*** 
(0.0439) 
0.3241*** 
(0.0429) 
ERi,j,t   0.0627*** 
(0.0117) 
0.0692*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0691*** 
(0.0128) 
ERi,j,t  NoMAJi,j,t  
 
-0.0324* 
(0.0188) 
 
 
ERi,j,t  C1i,j,t   
 
 
 
-0.0497*** 
(0.0158) 
ERi,j,t  C2i,j,t    
 
 
 
0.0316 
(0.0276) 
Li,j,t   0.0043*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0042*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0043*** 
(0.0004) 
∆ Li,j,t  -0.0561*** 
(0.0216) 
-0.0548*** 
(0.0212) 
-0.0545*** 
(0.0210) 
∆ yj,t   -0.0192*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0194*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.0212*** 
(0.0050) 
EQi,j,t-1  -0.0009 
(0.0014) 
-0.0009 
(0.0014) 
-0.0009 
(0.0013) 
COMi,j,t  0.0069 
(0.0055) 
0.0060 
(0.0052) 
0.0057 
(0.0053) 
Interaction dummies No Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Tests    
   ER ERNoMAJ 0 
 [P-value]
 0.0368** 
[0.0234] 
 
ER ERC1 0     
 [P-value] 
  0.0194  
[0.1713] 
P-value AR(2) test 0.1854 0.2005 0.2277 
P-value Hansen test 0.3481 0.3614 0.3932 
N. Banks 873 873 873 
N. Obs. 3406 3406 3406 
Standard deviation of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions/total assets ; ER = earnings before taxes & loan loss 
provisions/total assets; Dummy variable: NoMAJ = equals 1 if bank has no majority owner; C1 = equals 1 if 
bank is in Cluster 1 (low ownership concentration) ; C2 = equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 2 (medium ownership 
concentration); L = net loans/total assets; ∆L = loan growth rate; ∆y = GDP growth rate; EQ = equity/total 
assets; COM  =  commissions & fees income/total assets. 
  
 Table 5. Supervisory strength, degree of ownership concentration and income smoothing 
for European commercial banks for the period 2004-2009 (two-step system GMM 
estimator) 
 Eq. (1) augmented 
(Baseline) 
Eq. (4) Eq. (5) 
LLPi,j,t-1   0.3179*** 
(0.0477) 
0.3201*** 
(0.0442) 
0.3140*** 
(0.0430) 
ERi,j,t-1  0.1020*** 
(0.0197) 
0.1132*** 
(0.0210) 
0.1190*** 
(0.0215) 
ERi,j,t  SupRegj  -0.0164*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0173*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0194*** 
(0.0052) 
ERi,j,t  NoMAJi,j,t   
 
-0.0418** 
(0.0182) 
 
 
ERi,j,t  C1i,j,t   
 
 
 
-0.0614*** 
(0.0165) 
ERi,j,t  C2i,j,t    
 
 
 
0.0307 
(0.0259) 
Li,j,t   0.0040*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0039*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0040*** 
(0.0004) 
∆ Li,j,t  -0.0523** 
(0.0211) 
-0.0499** 
(0.0204) 
-0.0486** 
(0.0201) 
∆ yj,t   -0.0195*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0196*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0217*** 
(0.0044) 
EQi,j,t  -0.0005 
(0.0013) 
-0.0005 
(0.0013) 
-0.0004 
(0.0013) 
COMi,j,t  0.0083* 
(0.0050) 
0.0073 
(0.0046) 
0.0070 
(0.0048) 
Interaction dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects No No No 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal effects: All banks If NoMAJi,j,t =0 In Cluster 2 & 3 
ER at Min(SupReg) 0.1020*** 
[0.0000] 
0.1132*** 
[0.0000] 
0.1190*** 
[0.0000] 
ER at Med(SupReg) 0.0693*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0785*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0802*** 
[0.0000] 
ER at Max(SupReg) 0.0202 
[0.1400] 
0.0265* 
[0.0531] 
0.0221 
[0.1065] 
  If NoMAJi,j,t =1 In Cluster 1 
ER at Min(SupReg)  0.0714*** 
[0.0002] 
0.0576*** 
[0.0014] 
ER at Med(SupReg)  0.0367** 
[0.0146] 
0.0189 
[0.1636] 
ER at Max(SupReg)  -0.0153 
[0.4451] 
-0.0393** 
[0.0460] 
P-value AR(2) test 0.1803 0.1960 0.2287 
P-value Hansen test 0.4036 0.4113 0.4528 
N. Banks 873 873 873 
N. Obs. 3406 3406 3406 
 
 
Standard deviation of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. For 
marginal effects, P-value is given in brackets.  
Variable definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions/total assets ; ER = earnings before taxes & loan loss 
provisions/total assets; SupReg = index for strength of supervisory regime; Dummy variables: NoMAJ = 
equals 1 if bank has no majority owner; C1 = equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 1 (low ownership concentration) ; 
C2 = equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 2 (medium ownership concentration); L = net loans/total assets; ∆L = loan 
growth rate; ∆y = GDP growth rate; EQ = equity/total assets; COM  =  commissions & fees income/total 
assets. 
 Table 6. External audit quality, degree of ownership concentration and income 
smoothing for European commercial banks for the period 2004-2009 (two-step system 
GMM estimator) 
 Eq. (1) augmented 
(Baseline) 
Eq. (4) Eq. (5) 
LLPi,j,t-1   0.3130*** 
(0.0492) 
0.3161*** 
(0.0453) 
0.3114*** 
(0.0437) 
ERi,j,t-1  0.1577*** 
(0.0290) 
0.1641*** 
(0.0297) 
0.1726*** 
(0.0308) 
ERi,j,t  QualAuditj  -0.0296*** 
(0.0070) 
-0.0294*** 
(0.0071) 
-0.0316*** 
(0.0072) 
ERi,j,t  NoMAJi,j,t   
 
-0.0331* 
(0.0184) 
 
 
ERi,j,t  C1i,j,t   
 
 
 
-0.0577*** 
(0.0161) 
ERi,j,t  C2i,j,t    
 
 
 
0.0336 
(0.0255) 
Li,j,t   0.0039*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0038*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0039*** 
(0.0004) 
∆ Li,j,t  -0.0479** 
(0.0206) 
-0.0459** 
(0.0198) 
-0.0439** 
(0.0194) 
∆ yj,t   -0.0182*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0185*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0204*** 
(0.0045) 
EQi,j,t -0.0003 
(0.0013) 
-0.0004 
(0.0013) 
-0.0003 
(0.0013) 
COMi,j,t  0.0090* 
(0.0049) 
0.0080* 
(0.0045) 
0.0073 
(0.0046) 
Interaction dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects No No No
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Marginal effects: All banks If NoMAJi,j,t =0 In Cluster 2 & 3 
ER at Min(QualAudit) 0.1577*** 
[0.0000] 
0.1641*** 
[0.0000] 
0.1726*** 
[0.0000] 
ER at Med(QualAudit) 0.0394*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0465*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0463*** 
[0.0000] 
ER at Max(QualAudit) 0.0098  
[0.4434] 
0.0171 
0.1968] 
0.0148  
[0.2488] 
  If NoMAJi,j,t =1 In Cluster 1 
ER at Min(QualAudit)  0.1310*** 
[0.0000] 
0.1149*** 
[0.0016] 
ER at Med(QualAudit)  0.0134  
[0.4069] 
-0.0113  
[0.4310] 
ER at Max(QualAudit)  -0.0160  
[0.3983] 
-0.0429** 
[0.0185] 
P-value AR(2) test 0.1931 0.2041 0.2403 
P-value Hansen test 0.4373 0.4411 0.4865 
N. Banks 873 873 873 
N. Obs. 3406 3406 3406 
 Standard deviation of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. For 
marginal effects, P-value is given in brackets.  
Variable definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions/total assets ; ER = earnings before taxes & loan loss 
provisions/total assets; QualAudit = index for quality of external audits; Dummy variables: NoMAJ = equals 1 
if bank has no majority owner; C1 = equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 1 (low ownership concentration) ; C2 = 
equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 2 (medium ownership concentration); L = net loans/total assets; ∆L = loan 
growth rate; ∆y = GDP growth rate; EQ = equity/total assets; COM = commissions & fees income/total assets. 
 
 Table 7. Shareholder protection, degree of ownership concentration and income 
smoothing for European commercial banks for the period 2004-2009 (two-step system 
GMM estimator) 
 Eq. (1) augmented 
(Baseline) 
Eq. (4) Eq. (5) 
LLPi,j,t-1   0.3263*** 
(0.0467) 
0.3273*** 
(0.0444) 
0.3225*** 
(0.0435) 
ERi,j,t-1  0.0434** 
(0.0171) 
0.0510*** 
(0.0174) 
0.0514*** 
(0.0181) 
ERi,j,t  ShareProctj  0.0160 
(0.0119) 
0.0152 
(0.0115) 
0.0149 
(0.0118) 
ERi,j,t  NoMAJi,j,t   
 
-0.0318* 
(0.0176) 
 
 
ERi,j,t  C1i,j,t   
 
 
 
-0.0458*** 
(0.0160) 
ERi,j,t  C2i,j,t    
 
 
 
0.0290 
(0.0281) 
Li,j,t  0.0041*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0040*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0041*** 
(0.0004) 
∆ Li,j,t  -0.0543** 
(0.0215) 
-0.0527** 
(0.0210) 
-0.0518** 
(0.0209) 
∆ yj,t   -0.0217*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0218*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0237*** 
(0.0043) 
EQi,j,t-1  -0.0009 
(0.0013) 
-0.0009 
(0.0013) 
-0.0009 
(0.0013) 
COMi,j,t  0.0034 
(0.0052) 
0.0024 
(0.0051) 
0.0018 
(0.0052) 
Interaction dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects No No No 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Tests    
   ER ERNoMAJ 0 
[P-value] 
 0.0192  
[0.3013] 
 
ER ERC1 0     
[P-value] 
  0.0056  
[0.7010] 
P-value AR(2) test 0.1903 0.2035 0.2289 
P-value Hansen test 0.4030 0.4096 0.4379 
N. Banks 873 873 873 
N. Obs. 3406 3406 3406 
Standard deviation of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions/total assets ; ER = earnings before taxes & loan loss 
provisions/total assets; ShareProct = index for degree of shareholder protection; Dummy variables: NoMAJ = 
equals 1 if bank has no majority owner; C1 = equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 1 (low ownership concentration) ; 
C2 = equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 2 (medium ownership concentration); L = net loans/total assets; ∆L = loan 
growth rate; ∆y = GDP growth rate; EQ = equity/total assets; COM = commissions & fees income/total assets. 
 
 Table 8. Risk preferences, degree of ownership concentration and income smoothing for 
European commercial banks for the period 2004-2009 (two-step system GMM 
estimator) 
 Eq. (1) augmented
(Baseline)
Eq. (3) augmented 
 
Eq. (1) augmented 
(Baseline) 
Eq. (3) augmented 
 
LLPi,j,t-1   0.3586*** 
(0.0436) 
0.3603*** 
(0.0420) 
0.3468*** 
(0.0438) 
0.3449*** 
(0.0423) 
ERi,j,t-1  0.0630*** 
(0.0197) 
0.0746*** 
(0.0212) 
0.0727*** 
(0.0183) 
0.0831*** 
(0.0200) 
ERi,j,t   SDAdjROE i,j,t  -0.0027 
(0.0144) 
-0.0046 
(0.0152) 
 
 
 
 
ERi,j,t   AdjZi,j,t  
 
 
 
0.0106 
(0.0119) 
0.0099 
(0.0121) 
ERi,j,t  C1i,j,t   
 
-0.0575*** 
(0.0157) 
 
 
-0.0585*** 
(0.0165) 
ERi,j,t  C2i,j,t    
 
0.0161 
(0.0309) 
 
 
0.0156 
(0.0332) 
Li,j,t   0.0039*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0039*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0039*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0040*** 
(0.0005) 
∆ Li,j,t  -0.0505** 
(0.0231) 
-0.0464** 
(0.0225) 
-0.0462* 
(0.0240) 
-0.0436* 
(0.0233) 
∆ yj,t   -0.0174*** 
(0.0050) 
-0.0195*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0186*** 
(0.0050) 
-0.0206*** 
(0.0052) 
EQi,j,t-1  -0.0005 
(0.0016) 
-0.0007 
(0.0016) 
-0.0011 
(0.0016) 
-0.0012 
(0.0016) 
NFCi,j,t  0.0057 
(0.0062) 
0.0045 
(0.0060) 
0.0056 
(0.0063) 
0.0043 
(0.0061) 
SDAdjROE i,j,t 
 
0.0338 
(0.0217) 
0.0338 
(0.0226) 
 
 
 
 
AdjZi,j,t  
 
 
 
-0.0370** 
(0.0167) 
-0.0345** 
(0.0170) 
Interaction dummies No  Yes  No  Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Tests: 
ER ERC1 0     
[P-value] 
  
0.0171  
[0.3880] 
  
0.0246  
[0.1729] 
P-value AR(2) test 0.3022 0.3183 0.3111 0.3327 
P-value Hansen test 0.3221 0.2620 0.4378 0.3072 
N. Banks 815 815 815 815 
N. Obs. 3197 3197 3197 3197 
 
Standard deviation of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***.  
Variable definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions/total assets ; ER = earnings before taxes & loan loss 
provisions/total assets; SDAdjROE=StDev(ER/E), where E is total equity ; AdjZ=(100+AdjROE)/SDAdjROE, 
where AdjROE=Mean(ER/E) is average adjusted return on equity (in percentages); SDAdjROE & AdjROE are 
calculated over 3-year rolling windows; Dummy variables: C1 = equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 1 (low ownership 
concentration) ; C2 = equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 2 (medium ownership concentration); L = net loans/total 
assets; ∆L = loan growth rate; ∆y = GDP growth rate; EQ = equity/total assets; COM = commissions & fees 
income/total assets. 
 
 Table 9. Listed vs. non-listed banks, degree of ownership concentration and income 
smoothing for European commercial banks for the period 2004-2009 (two-step system 
GMM estimator) 
 Eq. (1) augmented 
(Baseline) 
Eq. (2) augmented 
 
Eq. (3) augmented 
 
LLPi,j,t-1  0.3285*** 
(0.0460) 
0.3280*** 
(0.0443) 
0.3239*** 
(0.0433) 
ERi,j,t 0.0668*** 
(0.0125) 
0.0715*** 
(0.0130) 
0.0709*** 
(0.0130) 
ERi,j,t  LISTEDi,j,t -0.0696*** 
(0.0261) 
-0.0604** 
(0.0250) 
-0.0538** 
(0.0244) 
ERi,j,t  NoMAJi,j,t  
 
-0.0259 
(0.0201) 
 
 
ERi,j,t  C1i,j,t  
 
 
 
-0.0431*** 
(0.0165) 
ERi,j,t  C2i,j,t   
 
 
 
0.0331 
(0.0280) 
Li,j,t  0.0043*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0042*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0043*** 
(0.0004) 
∆ Li,j,t -0.0553** 
(0.0216) 
-0.0545** 
(0.0212) 
-0.0539** 
(0.0210) 
∆ yj,t  -0.0183*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.0186*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.0206*** 
(0.0050) 
EQi,j,t-1 -0.0008 
(0.0014) 
-0.0008 
(0.0014) 
-0.0008 
(0.0014) 
COMi,j,t 0.0066 
(0.0056) 
0.0059 
(0.0053) 
0.0056 
(0.0053) 
Interaction dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Tests:    
   ER ER LISTED 0   
[P-value]
-0.0027  
[0.9088] 
0.0111  
[0.6502] 
0.0171  
0.4739] 
ER ERC1 0     
 [P-value] 
  0.0278* 
[0.0811] 
     ER ER C1 ER LISTED 0  
 [P-value] 
  -0.0259  
[0.2649] 
AR(2) test 0.1905 0.2022 0.2244 
Hansen test 0.3460 0.3588 0.3884 
N. Banks 873 873 873 
N. Obs. 3406 3406 3406 
Standard deviation of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions/total assets ; ER = earnings before taxes & loan loss 
provisions/total assets; Dummy variables: LISTED = equals 1 if bank is listed on stock market; NoMAJ = equals 
1 if bank has no majority owner; C1 = equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 1 (low ownership concentration) ; C2 = 
equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 2 (medium ownership concentration); L = net loans/total assets; ∆L = loan growth 
rate; ∆y = GDP growth rate; EQ = equity/total assets; COM  =  commissions & fees income/total assets. 
 
 Table 10. Big Four auditors, degree of ownership concentration, income smoothing and 
regulatory regime, 2004-2009, (two-step system GMM estimator) 
 Eq. (3) 
augmented 
Eq. (5) 
augmented 
Eq. (5) 
augmented 
Eq. (5) 
augmented 
LLPi,j,t-1  0.3526*** 
(0.0512) 
0.3406*** 
(0.0505) 
0.3490*** 
(0.0511) 
0.3629*** 
(0.0527) 
ERi,j,t  0.0920*** 
(0.0293) 
0.1389*** 
(0.0315) 
0.2139*** 
(0.0359) 
0.0677* 
(0.0373) 
ERi,j,t  C1i,j,t -0.0592*** 
(0.0225)
-0.0616*** 
(0.0207)
-0.0504*** 
(0.0192)
-0.0488** 
(0.0222)
ERi,j,t  C2i,j,t  0.0197 
(0.0281) 
0.0261 
(0.0269) 
0.0276 
(0.0259) 
0.0158 
(0.0281) 
ERi,j,t  SupRegj  
 
-0.0228*** 
(0.0064) 
 
 
 
 
ERi,j,t  QualAuditj   -0.0427*** 
(0.0085)
 
 
ERi,j,t  ShareProctj  
 
 
 
 
 
0.0177 
(0.0164) 
ERi,j,t   BIG4i,j,t -0.0345 
(0.0301) 
-0.0234 
(0.0283) 
-0.0060 
(0.0260) 
-0.0301 
(0.0293) 
Li,j,t 0.0041*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0038*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0034*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0037*** 
(0.0005) 
∆ Li,j,t -0.0691*** 
(0.0231) 
-0.0606*** 
(0.0223) 
-0.0427** 
(0.0210) 
-0.0486** 
(0.0221) 
∆ yj,t -0.0128*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0150*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0211*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0273*** 
(0.0052) 
EQi,j,t-1 -0.0010 
(0.0014) 
-0.0002 
(0.0014) 
0.0001 
(0.0014) 
-0.0011 
(0.0014) 
COMi,j,t 0.0065 
(0.0058) 
0.0099* 
(0.0054) 
0.0075 
(0.0050) 
0.0021 
(0.0058) 
Interaction dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes No No No 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald tests     
ER ER C1 0     
       [P-value] 
Marginal effects: 
0.0328 
[0.1894] 
 
 
 
 
0.0189 
[0.4559] 
  In Clusters 2 & 3  
ER at Min(REG)  0.1389*** 
[0.0000] 
0.2139*** 
[0.0000] 
 
ER at Med(REG)  0.0933*** 
[0.0006] 
0.0433* 
[0.0700] 
 
ER at Max(REG)  0.0249 
[0.4151]
0.0006  
[0.9826]
 
  In Cluster 1  
ER at Min(REG)  0.0773*** 
[0.0023]
0.1635*** 
[0.0000]
 
ER at Med(REG)  0.0317 
[0.1334] 
-0.0071 
[0.7442] 
 
ER at Max(REG)  -0.0367  
[0.1861] 
-0.0498* 
[0.0549] 
 
P-value AR(2) test 0.3679 0.3705 0.3756 0.3762 
P-value Hansen test 0.5050 0.5476 0.5490 0.5992 
N. Banks 643 643 643 643 
N. Obs. 2554 2554 2554 2554 
 
Standard deviation of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***.Variable 
definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions/total assets ; ER = earnings before taxes & loan loss provisions/total 
assets; Dummy variables: C1 = equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 1 (low ownership concentration) ; C2 = equals 1 
if bank is in Cluster 2 (medium ownership concentration); SupReg = index for strength of supervisory regime; 
QualAudit = index for quality of external audits; ShareProct = index for degree of shareholder protection; 
BIG4 = equals 1 if bank is audited by Big 4; L = net loans/total assets; ∆L = loan growth rate; ∆y = GDP 
growth rate; EQ = equity/total assets; COM  = commissions & fees income/total assets. 
 Table 11. Market discipline of debtholders, degree of ownership concentration and 
income smoothing for European commercial banks for the period 2004-2009 (two-step 
system GMM estimator) 
 Eq. (2) 
augmented 
Eq. (3) 
augmented 
Eq. (2) 
augmented 
Eq. (3) 
augmented 
LLPi,j,t-1  0.3416*** 
(0.0522) 
0.3381*** 
(0.0517) 
0.3558*** 
(0.0683) 
0.3565*** 
(0.0692) 
ERi,j,t  0.0602*** 
(0.0165) 
0.0608*** 
(0.0162) 
0.0730*** 
(0.0158) 
0.0696*** 
(0.0154) 
ERi,j,t  NoMAJi,j,t -0.0362* 
(0.0198) 
 
 
-0.0377* 
(0.0214) 
 
 
ERi,j,t  C1i,j,t  
 
-0.0580*** 
(0.0194) 
 
 
-0.0412* 
(0.0215) 
ERi,j,t  C2i,j,t  
 
0.0123 
(0.0286) 
 
 
0.0290 
(0.0321) 
ERi,j,t   MFi,j,t 0.0005 
(0.0006) 
0.0006 
(0.0006) 
- - 
MFi,j,t 0.0010 
(0.0008) 
0.0009 
(0.0008) 
- - 
ERi,j,t   WMFi,j,t - - -0.0000 
(0.0003) 
-0.0000 
(0.0003) 
WMFi,j,t - - 0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
Li,j,t  0.0039*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0040*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0036*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0037*** 
(0.0005) 
∆ Li,j,t -0.0504** 
(0.0230) 
-0.0511** 
(0.0226) 
-0.0691** 
(0.0284) 
-0.0709** 
(0.0285) 
∆ yj,t  -0.0154*** 
(0.0059) 
-0.0167*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0186* 
(0.0099) 
-0.0190* 
(0.0099) 
EQi,j,t-1 0.0007 
(0.0016) 
0.0006 
(0.0016) 
0.0008 
(0.0016) 
0.0006 
(0.0016) 
COMi,j,t 0.0034 
(0.0057) 
0.0034 
(0.0058) 
0.0014 
(0.0057) 
0.0017 
(0.0058) 
Interaction dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Tests     
   ER ERNoMAJ 0 
 [P-value]
0.0240 
[0.2134] 
 0.0353 
[0.1046] 
 
ER ERC1 0     
 [P-value] 
 0.0028 
[0.8931] 
 0.0283 
[0.2280] 
P-value AR(2) test 0.2126 0.2371 0.0627 0.0629 
P-value Hansen test 0.2099 0.2221 0.1542 0.1465 
N. Banks 813 813 750 750 
N. Obs. 3019 3019 2789 2789 
Standard deviation of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions/total assets ; ER = earnings before taxes & loan loss 
provisions/total assets; Dummy variable: NoMAJ = equals 1 if bank has no majority owner; C1 = equals 1 if 
bank is in Cluster 1 (low ownership concentration) ; C2 = equals 1 if bank is in Cluster 2 (medium ownership 
concentration); MF = (money-market funding + bonds + subordinated debt + hybrid capital)/total assets; WMF = 
MF  Legal with Legal an index measuring the level of law enforcement; L = net loans/total assets; ∆L = loan 
growth rate; ∆y = GDP growth rate; EQ = equity/total assets; COM  = commissions & fees income/total assets. 
 
 Table 12. Majority shareholder type, degree of ownership concentration and income 
smoothing for European commercial banks for the period 2004-2009 (two-step system 
GMM estimator) 
 Eq. (2) augmented 
 
LLPi,j,t-1  
 
0.3288*** 
(0.0437) 
ERi,j,t 
 
0.0910*** 
(0.0304) 
ERi,j,t    NoMAJi,j,t -0.0540 
(0.0329) 
ERi,j,t   Mbanki,j,t  -0.0301 
(0.0317) 
ERi,j,t   Mindusti,j,t  
 
-0.0076 
(0.0407) 
ERi,j,t   Mfamilyi,j,t  
 
-0.0108 
(0.0458) 
ERi,j,t   Motheri,j,t 
 
-0.0427 
(0.0425) 
Li,j,t 
 
0.0042*** 
(0.0005) 
∆ Li,j,t  
 
-0.0554*** 
(0.0211) 
∆ yj,t 
 
-0.0190*** 
(0.0049) 
EQi,j,t-1  
 
-0.0010 
(0.0014) 
NFCi,j,t 
 
0.0054 
(0.0050) 
Interaction dummies Yes
Country fixed effects Yes
Period fixed effects Yes
Wald Test:     ER ERNoMAJ 0 
[P-value] 
0.0370* 
[0.0231] 
AR(2) test 0.1909 
Hansen test 0.3633 
N. Banks 873 
N. Obs. 3406 
Standard deviation of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: LLP = loan loss provisions/total assets ; ER = earnings before taxes & loan loss 
provisions/total assets; Dummy variables: NoMAJ = equals 1 if bank has no majority owner; Mbank = equals 
1 if majority shareholder (holds more than 50%)  is a bank ; Mindust = equals 1 if majority shareholder is an 
industrial firm; Mfamily = equals 1 if majority shareholder is an individual or a family; Mother = equals 1 if 
majority shareholder is all remaining shareholder types excluding institutional investors; L = net loans/total 
assets; ∆L = loan growth rate; ∆y = GDP growth rate; EQ = equity/total assets; COM =  commissions & fees 
income/total assets. 
 
